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Abstract
Despite the significant responsibility that physicians have in healthcare delivery, we know
surprisingly little about why physician practice styles vary within or across institutions. Esti-
mating variation in physician practice styles is complicated by the fact that patients are
rarely randomly assigned to physicians. This paper uses the quasi-random assignment of
patients to physicians in emergency departments (EDs) to show how physicians vary in
their treatment of patients with minor injuries. The results reveal a considerable degree of
variation in practice styles within EDs; physicians at the 75th percentile of the spending dis-
tribution spend 20%more than physicians at the 25th percentile. Observable physician
characteristics do not explain much of the variation across physicians, but there is a signifi-
cant degree of sorting between physicians and EDs over time, with high-cost physicians
sorting into high-cost EDs as they gain experience. The results may shed light on why some
EDs remain persistently higher-cost than others.
Introduction
In recent years, policymakers have been looking for ways to improve the efficiency of the
United States healthcare system. The idea is that a more efficient system would reduce health-
care costs for a given set of health outcomes. The focus on efficiency stems from the fact that
per capita medical expenditures have increased dramatically in the US over the last 40 years rel-
ative to other OECD countries [1], while many national health indicators have not improved
[2]. The popular press claims that 30% of US medical care is wasteful, so recent attention has
turned to evaluating the costs and benefits of medical treatments [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. Since
physicians are at the forefront of medical decision-making, policymakers are increasingly
focused on physician decisions involving patient care, and recent research has attempted to
understand why physicians might treat similar patients differently [9] [10] [11].
The challenge associated with characterizing physician practice styles is that, in most set-
tings, patients select their physicians and physicians select their patients. If certain physicians
always treat the healthiest patients, then their practice styles will look efficient, when in fact
their practice styles reflect their patients’ underlying healthcare needs. This type of patient-
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physician sorting, however, is less likely to occur in emergency departments (EDs). Patients do
not choose their physicians and physicians are required by law to treat all patients [12]. There-
fore, EDs may provide more internally valid, quasi-experimental contexts in which to measure
differences in physician practice styles.
This paper focuses on variation in ED physician practice styles and asks whether the varia-
tion can be explained by differences in physician characteristics, such as medical training or
experience. Using data on all ED visits for patients with minor injuries in Florida from 2005 to
2011, where the standard of care ought to be relatively straightforward, I define ED physician
practice styles using the total costs and the total number of procedures associated with ED phy-
sician caseloads. The ED data contain attending physician license numbers, which I match to
Florida’s Healthcare Practitioner Database to obtain physician characteristics. The Practitioner
Database contains information about medical school training, residency training, specialty,
and gender. To estimate the variation in ED physician practice styles, I use physician fixed
effect models that compare physicians who work in the same emergency departments, but at
different points in time.
The paper has three findings. First, ED physician fixed effects explain an additional 3-11%
of the variation in total costs and procedures for patients with minor injuries. Even when medi-
cal care should be similar for all patients, physicians still treat patients differently. Second, phy-
sician experience is the primary characteristic that is associated with practice style variation
across physicians within EDs. Physicians with less than two years of experience spend 4.5%
more per visit than physicians with more than six years of experience. Physicians with less than
two years of experience do not generate fewer revisits to EDs, so their overall costs for “episodes
of care” are higher than the overall costs of more experienced physicians. Third, physician
experience is only associated with practice style variation because physicians differentially sort
into and out of EDs over time. High-cost physicians are less likely to work in EDs over time,
but if they remain working in EDs over time, then they are more likely to work in high-cost
EDs. The results imply that physicians sort into institutions that reinforce their existing prac-
tice style patterns.
Practice Style VariationWithin and Across US Hospitals
There is a considerable amount of research that shows how healthcare delivery varies across
hospitals and regions. After controlling for population health and local price levels, it finds sig-
nificant geographical differences in medical reimbursements, hospitalizations, surgical proce-
dures, and hospital readmissions for Medicare beneficiaries [13] [14] [15] [16]. These “regional
variations” lead some to conclude that healthcare in the United States is “flat-of-the-curve”
medicine [17]; i.e., that there are large differences in costs across regions, but there are fewer
differences in observable health outcomes [18] [19] [20]. Potential explanations for high costs
and flat outcomes include (1) “overuse,” where some hospitals prescribe invasive procedures
on increasingly marginal patients for increased profit and (2) different production functions,
where some hospitals are less productive than other hospitals at producing comparable out-
comes [21].
Since much of the variation in healthcare delivery comes from variation in testing and treat-
ment rather than price per se, a growing body of research focuses on the importance of physi-
cian practice styles and understanding why physicians treat similar patients differently. For
example, Epstein and Nicholson (2009) find that within-region variation in cesarean section
rates is two times greater than across-region variation, and that physician residency programs
explain 4% of the within-region variation in cesarean section rates [9]. Doyle et al. (2010) ran-
domize admitted patients to two resident teams in a Veterans Affairs hospital, where one
Variation in ED Physician Practice Styles
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residency team is affiliated with a higher-ranked medical institution. They find that the higher-
ranked residency team produced 10-25% shorter and less expensive hospital stays with no dif-
ferences in health outcomes [10]. Chan (2016) studies interns and residents in a Boston hospi-
tal and asks if the variation in physician practice styles is attributed to learning, authority, or
differences in physician characteristics. He finds that interns learn and change practice styles as
they advance to residency, but he finds no effects of other physician characteristics on practice
style patterns [22]. These papers show that physician practice styles can vary within regions,
and that medical training and experience can explain some of the differences in practice styles.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature on physician practice style variation.
First, it is one of the first papers to focus on the practice styles of fully licensed medical doctors
using a quasi-experimental design. Mehrotra et al. (2012) compare physicians across medical
practices in Massachusetts and find that physicians with less than 10 years of experience have
13% higher cost profiles than physicians with more than 40 years of experience, and Chang
et al. (2003) find that physicians with less than 6 years of experience spend more on laparo-
scopic-assisted vaginal hysterectomy, but no research has investigated the role of physician
experience in settings where patient-physician selection is less likely to occur [23, 24]. Second,
this is the first paper to show how physician sorting across institutions over time can explain
associations between physician experience and practice styles. While Doyle (2010) and Chan
(2016) have shown that physicians in training learn to adopt new practice styles, this paper
extends their work by showing that physicians later sort into healthcare institutions that match
their existing practice styles [10, 22].
ED Visit Data and Physician License Data
Matching physicians to their patients is a necessary first step to characterize physician practice
styles. Each time a patient visits a Florida ED she is treated by an attending physician on staff.
The Florida ED data contain attending physician license numbers, which can be matched to
the Florida Healthcare Practitioner Database. The Database contains the universe of medical
and osteopathic physicians who have ever been licensed to practice medicine in Florida. It has
information on each physician’s medical school, residency program, and personal characteris-
tics. These data and this study have been approved by Columbia University’s Institutional
Review Board protocol #AAAI1922 and are now approved by Hunter College’s Institutional
Review Board protocol #2016-0018. Written informed consent was not given by participants.
A waiver of consent was granted because the ED data were anonymized and de-identified prior
to analysis.
This paper uses a sample of ED visits for patients with minor injuries to estimate the varia-
tion in ED physician practice styles. To identify patients with minor injuries, I use the primary
diagnosis on the visit record and match it to the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project’s
(HCUP) Clinical Classification Software (CCS). The CCS diagnosis categories are more general
than ICD-9-CM codes, so there is less scope for physicians to differentially “upcode” patients.
Information about the CCS can be found in HCUP’s CCS user guide. To construct the sample,
I keep patients who have injuries where the probability of hospitalization is less than 10%,
though the average hospitalization rate for the sample is 1% (Table 1).
I focus on the sample of patients with minor injuries for two reasons. First, minor injuries
are relatively straightforward to treat, so it would be unusual to detect large practice style varia-
tion across physicians treating these types of patients. Second, patients with minor injuries are
rarely admitted to the hospital. This is an important feature because the Florida data do not
contain identifying information about ED physicians when patients get admitted to the hospi-
tal. The ED physician can be inferred from the timing of the visit, but inference is imperfect
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because most hospitals have multiple ED physicians working at the same time. Therefore, to
reduce the amount of measurement error that results from imperfect attribution of ED physi-
cians to hospitalized patients, I focus on patients with minor injuries where 99% of the sample
has identifying information about the ED physicians responsible for treatment and I attribute
identifying information for ED physicians to the remaining 1% of the sample that gets
hospitalized.
The summary statistics for the sample appear in Tables 1–3. Table 1 shows that there are
eleven types of injuries that account for 8.5 million, or 21% of Florida ED visits from 2005 to
2011. Some of the most common injuries include arm fractures, sprains and strains, open
wounds of the extremities, and superficial injuries or contusions. Tables 2 and 3 show how the
sample of visits for patients with minor injuries compares to the sample of visits for patients
without minor injuries. Patients with minor injuries are more likely to be male, to be white, to
be younger, and to have private health insurance compared to patients who do not have minor
injuries. The variation in the number of ED visits is relatively constant throughout the year,
but there are more visits during the waking hours of 8am-12am.
The average costs associated with ED visits for minor injuries appear in the bottom panel of
Table 2. The average total cost per visit is $630, which is considerably lower than the total costs
for patients without minor injuries ($2,530). Most of the total costs come from radiology fees
($244) and ED facility fees ($195). Costs are constructed by multiplying the hospital charge by
the cost-to-charge ratio (CCR), where the CCR comes from HCUP. I use the hospital group
CCR because it is available for all hospitals in the sample. The CCR varies across hospitals and
years and it captures the share of charges that hospitals typically recoup from payers. Multiply-
ing the charges by the CCR makes hospital costs more comparable across hospitals over time.
On average, patients with minor injuries receive 3.4 procedures compared to 3.8 procedures
for the sample of patients without minor injuries. Lastly, patients with minor injuries have a
1% probability of hospitalization compared to a 21% probability among patients without
minor injuries.
Table 1. Emergency Department Visits for Patients with Minor Injuries.
Patient’s Primary Diagnosis Fraction of Sample Hospitalization Rate CCS Code
Joint disorders 0.020 0.021 225
Arm fracture 0.072 0.059 229
Sprains and strains 0.255 0.0008 232
Open wounds of head, neck, or trunk 0.094 0.011 235
Open wounds of extremities 0.137 0.010 236
Superficial injury or contusion 0.239 0.002 239
Burns 0.015 0.036 240
Poisoning from nonmedical substance 0.012 0.019 243
Other injuries from external causes 0.093 0.016 244
Lymphadenitis 0.006 0.028 247
Allergic reactions 0.058 0.003 253
N = # Visits 8,517,491 0.01
Notes: Data source is the FL AHCA and HCUP Emergency Department Data. The diagnoses codes come from HCUP’s Clinical Classification System
(CCS) chapter 16, titled “Injury and poisoning.” The HCUP CCSmaps ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes to 260 aggregated diagnosis types. N is the number of ED
visits for patients with minor injuries, where the minor injury is the primary diagnosis on the ED record. The hospitalization rate is calculated using the number
of patients who were hospitalized with each injury divided by the total number of patients with each injury.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.t001
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Table 3 shows that there are 3,201 Florida ED physicians who treat on average 95 patients
with minor injuries per quarter, compared with 10,708 ED physicians who treat on average
134 patients without minor injuries per quarter. There are 207 hospital emergency departments
and most ED physicians work in multiple EDs. The average physician has about 14 years of
experience post-residency. Twenty-three percent of physicians have less than 6 years of experi-
ence and 5% of physicians have less than two years of experience. Eighty percent of physicians
hold Doctor of Medicine degrees (M.D.s) instead of Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degrees
(D.O.s), 19% are female, 21% speak Spanish, and 10% are specialists, where a specialist is certi-
fied in a field other than emergency medicine, internal medicine, family practice, or pediatrics.
Most physicians attended medical school in the United States and five percent attended top-20
Table 2. Characteristics of Patients with and without Minor Injuries.
Minor Injuries Otder Conditions
Patient Characteristics Mean Standard Dev Mean Standard Dev
Female 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.50
Age 36.49 23.03 39.65 25.20
White 0.66 0.47 0.58 0.49
Black 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42
Hispanic 0.13 0.33 0.16 0.37
Other Race 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19
Private Insurance 0.34 0.47 0.25 0.43
Medicaid 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.43
Medicare 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42
Uninsured 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42
Other Insurance 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.18
Visit Timing Mean Standard Dev Mean Standard Dev
Quarter 1: Jan-March 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44
Quarter 2: Apr-June 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
Quarter 3: July-Sep 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43
Quarter 4: Oct-Dec 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.44
Weekend 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45
Overnight: 12am-8am 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.37
Daytime: 8am-4pm 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50
Evening: 4pm-12am 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49
Healthcare Utilization Mean Standard Dev Mean Standard Dev
Total Costs $630.17 $2,680.79 $2,529.79 $7,465.44
Radiology Costs $244.48 $552.79 $443.19 $986.60
ED Costs $194.89 $168.63 $250.45 $324.81
Laboratory Costs $34.03 $289.53 $431.97 $1,084.88
Pharmacy Costs $34.90 $798.77 $370.38 $2,273.12
Medical Devices Costs $26.66 $397.91 $157.28 $1,016.80
Other Costs $95.21 $1,255.24 $876.53 $3,420.52
Number of Procedures 3.37 2.42 3.79 3.60
Hospitalized 0.01 0.10 0.21 0.41
N = # Visits 8,517,491 40,077,076
Notes: Data source is the FL AHCA Emergency Department Data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.t002
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medical schools for primary care according to the 2013 US News and World Report rankings. I
focus on the US News primary care rankings because those programs might be the best at
training physicians to treat minor injuries in either a primary care or an ED setting. In general,
the ED physicians who treat patients with minor injuries do not appear to be very different
from the ED physicians who treat all other patients.
Empirical Strategy
This paper’s conceptual experiment takes two patients with minor injuries who arrive in the
same emergency department, but who receive different physician assignments. The question is
whether their physician assignments affect the quality and quantity of healthcare services they
receive. The empirical strategy proceeds in three parts. First I ask how much of the variation in
healthcare utilization is explained by the attending ED physician. Conditional on the patient’s
demographic characteristics, health insurance, hospital ED, and the approximate timing of the
visit, do physician fixed effects improve the fit of the healthcare production function? Next I
justify the quasi-experimental design. I show that conditional on the hospital and the approxi-
mate timing of the visit, patients are quasi-randomly assigned to ED physicians. Last I describe
how I estimate the relationship between physician characteristics and physician practice styles.
Variation in ED Physician Practice Styles
There is documented variation in healthcare utilization across regions, but variation in health-
care utilization within emergency departments has not been well studied. This section shows
that such variation exists and that the variation is partially explained by physician fixed effects.
At the outset, it is not clear that patients who visit the same emergency department for the
same injury would be treated differently. By design, two observably similar patients treated at
the same ED at roughly the same time have the same healthcare needs and have the same
access to facilities and ancillary staff. They have identical characteristics, so the hospital is
unlikely to have an incentive to treat them differently. However, the patients can have different
Table 3. Characteristics of ED Physicians who Treat Patients with and without Minor Injuries.
Minor Injuries Other Conditions
Physician Characteristics Mean Standard Dev Mean Standard Dev
Experience (years) 13.74 9.16 13.22 9.05
<2 Years of Experience 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24
2–4 Years of Experience 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28
4–6 Years of Experience 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.29
<6 Years of Experience 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Degree of Medicine (M.D.) 0.80 0.40 0.82 0.38
Top-20 Medical School 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22
US Medical School 0.77 0.42 0.74 0.44
Female Physician 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
Spanish-Speaking Physician 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.44
Specialist Physician 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
# Physicians 3,201 10,708
# Visits 8,517,491 40,077,076
Notes: Data sources include the FL AHCA Emergency Department Data and the FL Department of Health’s Healthcare Practitioner Database.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.t003
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attending physician assignments and attending physicians may have different practice styles.
So a useful first step is to determine whether attending physician fixed effects increase the
goodness-of-fit in a model of healthcare utilization that already controls for the patient’s demo-
graphic characteristics, health insurance, hospital ED, and time period. To do this, I estimate
the following two models on the ED physician panel data set described in the previous section,
LogðYijhtÞ ¼ aþ gTt þ kXi þ dh þ lj þ ijht ð1Þ
LogðYijhtÞ ¼ aþ gTt þ kXi þ dh þ ljt þ ijht ð2Þ
Yijht includes either the total ED costs or the total number of procedures for patient i of physi-
cian j in hospital h at time t. Tt is a vector of time fixed effects, including the year×quarter, the
weekday, and the shift. There are three 8-hour shifts: shift 1 is from 12:00am to 8:00am, shift 2
is from 8:00am to 4:00pm, and shift 3 is from 4:00pm to 12:00am. Xi is a vector of patient char-
acteristics and health insurance categories. Patient characteristics include gender, age, race, and
ethnicity. Health insurance categories include Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, other
insurance, or self-pay. Sample means for the control variables are listed in Table 2. δh is a hos-
pital fixed effect, λj is a physician fixed that does not vary across hospitals or time, and λjt is a
physician-year-of-experience fixed effect that does not vary across hospitals, but does vary
within physicians over discrete years of experience since residency (numbered 1, 2, . . ., up to
more than 30 years). Eq (1) tests whether there are fixed differences across physicians in their
practice styles (i.e., “between” differences). Comparing the goodness-of-fit from Eqs (1) and
(2) tests whether there are also “within” differences in physician practice styles. If there is no
meaningful variation in physician practice styles within EDs, then controlling for physician
fixed effects or physician×experience fixed effects should not increase either model’s goodness
of fit.
Results for model fit appear in Table 4. Column 1 begins by controlling for patient charac-
teristics. Then each column adds an additional set of control variables. The focus is on the dif-
ferences from columns 3-6 when hospital fixed effects, physician fixed effects, and
physician×experience fixed effects are added to the model. Column 3 shows that hospital fixed
effects explain 9% of the variation in total ED costs and procedures before controlling for
Table 4. Measuring Practice Style Variation using ED Physician Fixed Effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shift, Weekday, Year×Quarter FEs X X X X X X
+ Patient Characteristics X X X X X
+ Hospital FEs X X X
+ ED Physician FEs X X
+ ED Physician×Experience FEs X
Log(Total Costs): Adjusted R 2 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22
Log(Total Procedures): Adjusted R 2 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.22
Notes: This table reports the adjusted R2s from regressions that capture the variation in healthcare utilization within and across EDs. The dependent
variables are the Log(Total Costs) and the Log(Total #Procedures) for each ED visit. The sample includes ED visits for patients with minor injuries. The
model in the first column controls for shift, weekday, and year×quarter fixed effects. The model in the second column adds patient age, gender, race,
ethnicity, and insurance. The model in the third column adds hospital fixed effects. The model in the fourth column removes hospital fixed effects and adds
physician fixed effects. The model in the fifth column includes physician and hospital fixed effects. The model in the sixth column includes
physician×experience and hospital fixed effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.t004
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physician fixed effects. Column 4 shows that physician fixed effects explain 10-11% of the vari-
ation in costs and procedures before controlling for hospital fixed effects. Incorporating physi-
cian fixed effects in addition to hospital fixed effects explains an additional 3% of the variation
in total costs and procedures (comparing columns 4 and 5). The results suggest that physicians
within hospitals treat similar patients differently, which is consistent with research in this area
and points to a growing topic of exploration.
Not all of the variation in physician practice styles is fixed however; some of it is time-vary-
ing. For example, columns 5 and 6 show that physician×experience fixed effects explain an
additional 2-4% of the variation in total costs and procedures compared to physician fixed
effects alone. Fig 1 plots the distributions of physician fixed effects (λj) and physician×experi-
ence fixed effects (λjt) after adjusting the estimates using the empirical Bayesian shrinkage
method described in Morris (1983) [25]. It shows that there is more variation in physician×ex-
perience fixed effects than physician fixed effects and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribu-
tional equivalence confirms with a p-value<0.0001. To understand the magnitude of the
difference, the distribution of physician fixed effects shows that a physician in the 75th percen-
tile spends 20% more than a physician in the 25th percentile, while the distribution of physicia-
n×experience fixed effects shows that a physician in the 75th percentile spends 26% more than
a physician in the 25th percentile.
Fig 1. Distributions of Physician and Physician×Experience Fixed Effects for Log(Costs). Notes: This figure
plots the distributions of physician fixed effects and physician×experience fixed effects. The blue dotted line plots
physician fixed effects λj from Eq (1) and the red solid line plots physician×experience fixed effects λjt from Eq (2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.g001
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Quasi-Random Assignment of Patients to ED Physicians
One threat to the experimental design is the systematic sorting of patients to physicians. With
sorting, patient characteristics can be correlated with physician characteristics and practice
styles. For instance, experienced physicians may perform more procedures if they treat patients
who have more complicated medical conditions. Sorting between patients and physicians
makes it difficult to uncover the association between physician characteristics and practice
styles. To address this concern, I use the following equation to test whether there is sorting
between patients and physicians in emergency departments,
Pjt ¼ aþ gTt þ kXi þ dh þ ijht ð3Þ
Pjt is one of the physician characteristics listed in Table 3 for physician j who treats patient i in
hospital h at time t. Pjt may represent physician experience, whether the physician has a M.D.
degree, graduated from a top-20 medical school, attended medical school in the US or abroad,
is female, is a specialist, or speaks Spanish. Physician experience is calculated as the difference
between the patient’s visit-date and the physician’s residency completion date. The rest of the
variables in Eq (3) are the same as in Eqs (1) and (2). The purpose of estimating Eq (3) is to test
whether some types of patients are more likely to be treated by some types of physicians.
If patient-physician assignments are quasi-random within the ED, then patient characteris-
tics should not predict physician characteristics in Eq (3). The κ vector tests whether patient
characteristics are correlated with attending physician characteristics. If the coefficients within
κ differ significantly from zero, then patients and physicians sort on observable characteristics,
which can invalidate the quasi-experimental design. The standard errors for Eq (3) are clus-
tered at the physician-level.
The results for Eq (3) appear in Table 5, and they show that patient characteristics explain
very little of the physician assignment. Individual patient characteristics are uncorrelated with
physician characteristics in 52 out of 63 cases. In the eleven cases where the characteristics are
statistically significantly correlated, the coefficient estimates are very small and marginally sig-
nificant. Moreover, 3 out of 63 cases should be significant with a p-value = 0.05. Therefore,
patient-physician sorting within EDs is unlikely to drive much of the results from the previous
section. Nevertheless, because some patient characteristics are correlated with some physician
characteristics, I next explore the degree to which the results from the previous section might
be biased due to sorting between patients and physicians within EDs.
To estimate how the results may be biased, I predict total costs using patient characteristics
(age, sex, race, ethnicity, insurance) and regress the predicted values on hospital fixed effects,
year×quarter fixed effects, weekday fixed effects, shift fixed effects, and physician fixed effects.
The F-test on the physician fixed effects yields a value of 72.31, so I can reject the null hypothe-
sis that there is no sorting between ED patients and physicians. To calibrate the degree of bias
due to sorting on observable characteristics, I first plot the distribution of the Bayesian-shrink-
age physician fixed effects that result from the latter regression. Then I compare that distribu-
tion to the distribution of Bayesian-shrinkage physician fixed effects from column 5 in Table 4.
If sorting on observables explained most of the variation across physicians in their spending
patterns, then those distributions would overlap considerably. If, however, there is a relatively
small degree of sorting and there is meaningful variation across physicians in their spending
patterns, then we would expect the first distribution to be clustered around zero with small var-
iance and the second distribution to be centered at zero, but to exhibit much higher variance.
Fig 2 plots these two distributions and supports the second interpretation of the data. Fig 2 also
shows that physicians near the 75th percentile of the predicted costs distribution treat patients
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that are only 2% more costly than the patients treated by physicians at the 25th percentile of
the distribution.
Second, I ask how likely it is that a “high-cost” physician, calculated using the Bayesian-
shrinkage physician fixed effects reported in column 5 of Table 4, matches to a predictably
“high-cost” patient, calculated using the observable patient characteristics age, sex, race, ethnic-
ity, and insurance. The results appear in Table 6 and show that a one-standard deviation
increase in predicted patient costs yields a 0.047-standard deviation increase in the Bayesian-
shrinkage physician fixed effects (i.e., “Physician Costs”). The R2 in Table 6 also shows that pre-
dicted patient costs can only explain about 0.2% of the variation in physician costs. Therefore,
sorting between patients and physicians is unlikely to be very problematic in the ED context.
Table 5. Quasi-RandomAssignment of Patients to ED Physicians.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exp M.D. Top-20 US Female Spanish Specialist
Female 0.0139 -0.0002 0.00004 0.0005 0.0009* 0.0002 -0.0007*
(0.0084) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Age 0.0011 -0.0001 0.00003 0.0003** -0.0003** -0.00001 0.0002***
(0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004)
Black 0.0110 -0.0017* -0.0012 0.0002 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0207) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Hispanic 0.0078 0.0015 -0.0021* -0.0017 0.0027 0.0006 -0.0019
(0.0519) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0011)
Other Race 0.0604 0.0013 0.0037 0.0005 0.0034 0.0018 0.0028
(0.0785) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0026)
Medicaid 0.0452 0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0045** 0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0010
(0.0327) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0009)
Medicare -0.0417 0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0056* 0.0060* -0.0025 -0.0037**
(0.0493) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0012)
Self-Pay 0.0060 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0017 0.0007 0.0013
(0.0258) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0008)
Other Insurance -0.0352 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0006 0.0013
(0.0318) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.00112)
Hospital FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year×Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Shift, Weekday FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491
R2 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10
Notes: The dependent variables are physician characteristics and they are listed at the top of each column. The independent variables are patient
characteristics and they are listed as rows. Each column represents estimates from a different regression. The sample includes ED visits for all patients with
minor injuries in Florida from 2005 to 2011. All regressions control for hospital fixed effects, year×quarter fixed effects, weekday fixed effects, and shift fixed
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Fig 2. Distributions of Physician Fixed Effects for Predicted vs. Realized Log(Costs). Notes: This figure plots
the distributions of physician fixed effects for predicted versus realized Log(Total Costs). The blue dotted line plots
the Bayesian-shrinkage physician fixed effects for predicted Log(Total Costs), where Log(Total Costs) were
predicted using patient age, sex, race, ethnicity, and insurance. The red solid line plots the Bayesian-shrinkage
physician fixed effects from Eq (1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.g002
Table 6. Correlation Between Predicted Patient Costs and Physician Fixed Effects.
Physician Cost (I.e., Physician FE)




Notes: Predicted Patient Costs are estimated from a regression of Log(Total Costs) on patient age, sex, race,
ethnicity, and insurance. Physician Cost represents the Bayesian-shrinkage physician fixed effects from Eq
(1). Predicted Patient Cost and Physician Cost are standardized to have mean = 0 and variance = 1.
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Physician Characteristics and Practice Styles
This section presents an ordinary least squares (OLS) model to estimate the relationship
between physician characteristics and ED physician practice styles. The OLS model starts with
the same healthcare production function as in previous sections, but replaces the physician
fixed effects with a full set of observable physician characteristics. In this framework, physician
experience varies within physicians over time, while physician medical training and personal
characteristics are fixed within physicians over time. Thus, the estimating equation becomes,
LogðYijhtÞ ¼ aþ b11½expjt < 2 þ b21½2  expjt < 4 þ b31½4  expjt < 6
þcPj þ gTt þ kXi þ dh þ ijht
ð4Þ
Yijht includes either the total ED costs or the total number of procedures for each ED visit,
depending on the specification. Tt, Xi, and δh are defined as in previous sections. Pj is a vector
of physician characteristics that do not vary within physicians over time. These characteristics
include the physician’s gender, specialty, Spanish-speaking ability, medical degree type, US
medical school training, and whether the physician’s medical school is ranked in the top-20.
To estimate the effects of physician experience, I create indicator variables that equal 1 if the
physician has less than two years of experience, two-to-four years of experience, or four-to-six
years of experience post-residency. Therefore, β1, β2, and β3 should be interpreted relative to
physicians with more than six years of experience. As in previous sections, the standard errors
are clustered at the physician-level.
Results
This paper asks whether ED physicians vary in their practice styles and whether physician
characteristics can explain some of that variation. In this section, I find that physician experi-
ence and specialty explain differences in ED practice styles, but that medical education, gender,
and Spanish-speaking ability do not. Physician experience is associated with practice styles pri-
marily because high- and low-cost physicians sort into different work environments over time.
ED Physician Characteristics and Healthcare Utilization
Table 7 shows how different physician characteristics are associated with total costs and proce-
dures. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 7 report results from an OLS regression that does not control
for patient characteristics, while columns 2 and 5 report results that control for patient charac-
teristics. Comparing the estimates across the two sets of columns reveals the degree to which
the estimates would have been biased due to sorting between physicians and patients. In gen-
eral, the association between physician characteristics and practice styles is attenuated by con-
trolling for patient characteristics, suggesting a small amount of bias due to nonrandom
assignment; however, the results across the two sets of columns are not statistically different
from one another and so the potential for bias is somewhat limited, consistent with what was
found in the previous section.
Table 7 shows that physician experience is the main characteristic that is associated with
variability in total costs and procedures. Physicians with less than two years of experience post-
residency spend 4.5% more per visit and they perform 3.4% more procedures than physicians
with six or more years of experience. Physicians with 2-4 years of experience spend 3.9% more
per visit than physicians with six or more years of experience, but there is no statistically signif-
icant difference in the number of procedures they perform. The experience effect tapers off as
physicians age because physicians with 4-6 years of experience only spend 2.6% more per visit
than physicians with more than 6 years of experience.
Variation in ED Physician Practice Styles
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882 August 12, 2016 12 / 19
Several other physician characteristics are not associated with differences in ED practice
styles. For example, physicians who trained at top-20 medical schools do not spend less than
physicians who trained at lower-ranked medical schools. Similarly, US medical school training,
physician gender, and Spanish-speaking ability do not explain differences in ED practice styles.
Specialists spend 2.9% more than non-specialists, but they do not perform more procedures.
Physicians with Doctor of Medicine degrees (M.D.s) perform 2% fewer procedures, but do not
spend less than physicians with Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine degrees (D.O.s). Moreover,
observable physician characteristics explain very little of the overall variation in total spending
or procedures, which can be seen by comparing the R2 in columns 2 and 5 of Table 7 to the R2s
in column 3 of Table 4. However, it is important to note that these lack of findings could be
specific to the sample of patients with minor injuries.
Doyle et al. (2010) find that physicians who spend more on hospitalized patients tend to uti-
lize more testing equipment than physicians who spend less, so Table 8 shows how physicians
with less experience utilize different resources within the ED [10]. It shows that physicians
with less experience spend more on all items, including but not limited to radiology tests, labo-
ratory tests, and pharmacy prescriptions. Physicians with less than two years of experience
spend $55.25 more per patient, where 65% of that higher spending comes from radiology test-
ing, laboratory testing, and pharmaceutical prescriptions. Other types of spending account for
the remaining 35%.
Table 7. ED Physician Characteristics and Healthcare Utilization.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Costs) Log(Costs) Log(Costs) Log(Procs) Log(Procs) Log(Procs)
<2 Years of Experience 0.052***(0.012) 0.045***(0.010) 0.023(0.018) 0.039***(0.009) 0.034***(0.009) 0.012(0.019)
2–4 Years of Experience 0.046***(0.010) 0.039***(0.010) 0.012(0.014) 0.016*(0.008) 0.012(0.007) -0.007(0.016)
4–6 Years of Experience 0.029**(0.010) 0.026**(0.009) -0.003(0.010) 0.018*(0.008) 0.016*(0.007) -0.003(0.012)
Degree of Medicine (MD) -0.010(0.011) -0.009(0.010) -0.017*(0.007) -0.017**(0.006)
Top-20 Medical School 0.001(0.018) -0.001(0.017) 0.010(0.011) 0.008(0.010)
US Medical School 0.023*(0.012) 0.014(0.011) -0.004(0.007) -0.010(0.006)
Female Physician -0.0002(0.011) 0.008(0.010) -0.006(0.007) -0.001(0.006)
Spanish-Speaking -0.002(0.011) -0.002(0.010) 0.005(0.007) 0.005(0.006)
Specialist 0.038*(0.015) 0.029*(0.015) 0.019*(0.010) 0.014(0.009)
Hospital FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year×Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Shift, Weekday FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
Patient Characteristics Y Y Y Y
Physician FEs Y Y
N 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491
R2 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.18
Notes: The dependent variables are the log(Total Costs) and the log(Total Procedures) for each ED visit. The sample includes ED visits for all patients with
minor injuries in Florida from 2005 to 2011. All regressions control for hospital fixed effects, year×quarter fixed effects, weekday fixed effects, and shift fixed
effects. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) also control for patient age, gender, race, ethnicity, and health insurance. Columns (3) and (6) control for physician fixed
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One unanswered question is whether physicians learn to spend less over time or whether
high-cost physicians sort into new work environments over time. Columns 3 and 6 from
Table 6 test the hypothesis that physicians learn to spend less over time by showing the rela-
tionship between physician experience and practice styles after controlling for physician fixed
effects. The results show that physician experience is not associated with lower spending within
physicians over time, suggesting that ED physicians do not learn to spend less over time.
Figs 3 and 4 test the hypothesis that high-cost physicians sort into new work environments
over time. Physicians are considered “high-cost” if they are in the top 10% of the physician
fixed effects distribution for Log(Costs) estimated from Eq (1). The x-axes in Figs 3 and 4 show
quarters since physicians began working in any Florida ED, where the earliest possible start
date was Q1-2005 because that is the start of the sample. The y-axis in Fig 3 shows the proba-
bility that physicians are still working in any Florida ED. The red dotted line represents high-
cost physicians and the blue solid line represents all other physicians. The figure shows that
high-cost physicians are 3% less likely to work in any Florida ED two years after their initial
start dates.
Fig 4 shows that when high-cost physicians continue to work in Florida EDs, they are more
likely to sort into high-cost EDs over time. A high-cost ED is an ED in the top quartile of the
distribution for the average total costs of ED visits, where the average total costs are calculated
using the entire sample of patients (from Table 2), not only the sample of patients with minor
injuries. Within the first six years of experience post-residency, high-cost physicians are three
times more likely to work in high-cost Florida EDs compared to non-high-cost physicians, and
most of the sorting occurs within the first two years post-residency. Thus, experienced ED
Table 8. ED Physician Experience and Itemized Spending.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Radiology Labs Pharmacy Devices Facility Other
<2 Years of Experience $55.25*** $26.39*** $4.68*** $5.23** $3.74** $4.13* $11.09**
(10.23) (4.81) (0.97) (1.77) (1.14) (1.70) (3.93)
2–4 Years of Experience $44.83*** $23.00*** $3.49*** $4.11** $2.02* $3.88* $8.33**
(8.29) (4.40) (0.82) (1.32) (0.85) (1.61) (3.32)
4–6 Years of Experience $30.08*** $13.43*** $2.83*** $3.01* $1.27 $0.37 $9.17**
(7.60) (3.83) (0.75) (1.22) (0.70) (1.69) (2.91)
Dependent Variable Mean $630 $244 $34 $35 $27 $195 $95
Hospital FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year×Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Shift, Weekday FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Patient Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491 8,517,491
R2 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.20 0.06
Notes: The dependent variables are itemized costs for each ED visit. The sample includes ED visits for all patients with minor injuries in Florida from 2005 to
2011. All regressions control for hospital fixed effects, year×quarter fixed effects, weekday fixed effects, shift fixed effects, physician characteristics, and the
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physicians only appear to have lower-cost practice styles. In reality, they have already sorted
into work environments that reflect their styles.
ED Physician Characteristics and Patient Health Outcomes
Does lower ED spending mean that physicians are practicing more efficiently, or are they pro-
viding lower quality care? To answer this question, it is important to note that patients with
minor injuries are unlikely to experience many serious negative health outcomes. For example,
the health economics literature often uses inpatient mortality and delayed hospital admission
as health outcomes, but these are inappropriate outcomes in this context because only 1% of
patients with minor injuries get admitted to the hospital on the initial visit, and almost no one
dies in the hospital from a minor injury. Therefore, the faster physicians can diagnose injuries,
and treat them, the more efficient they are. However, physicians can still make mistakes, which
would result in lower quality care.
One way to measure lower quality healthcare is to see if patients revisit EDs within short
periods of time following their initial visits. For example, revisits for the same medical condi-
tion could indicate that physicians made mistakes or cut corners. To understand whether phy-
sicians who spend less practice more efficiently, I add the costs associated with ED re-visits to
the costs associated with initial ED visits to develop total costs for “full episodes of care.” This
Fig 3. Attrition of High-Cost ED Physicians Over Time. Notes: This figure plots the probabilities that physicians
work in any ED following their first quarter of work, where their earliest start date occurs on or after Q1-2005. The
blue solid line plots the probability that physicians who are not high-cost work in any ED, while the red dotted line
plots the probability that high-cost physicians work in any ED. High-cost physicians are in the top 10% of the
Bayesian-shrinkage physician fixed effects distribution for Log(Costs) estimated from Eq (1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.g003
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section presents results for full episodes of care for minor injuries up to 28 days after initial ED
visits, where revisits may or may not have resulted in hospitalizations.
In previous sections I estimated the results using a panel of physicians, but for data privacy
reasons, I estimate the results in this section at a more aggregated level. The revisit variables
come from the HCUP databases and researchers are prohibited from linking the visit-level
data to identifying information about physicians. Therefore, the analysis in this section pro-
ceeds at the hospital-year-quarter-weekday-hour level. The benefit of aggregation is that the
criteria for identification are less stringent and researchers in the economics of education litera-
ture have used similar methods before [26].
To make the results in this section comparable to the results in the previous section, I first
residualize the outcome variables at the visit-level using the same patient characteristics that
appear in Table 8. Then I aggregate the residuals to the hospital-year-quarter-weekday-hour. I
also weight the regressions by the number of ED visits in each cell. Thus the estimation equa-
tion becomes,
Ŷht ¼ aþ cPht þ gTt þ dh þ ht ð5Þ
Fig 4. Sorting Between Physicians and EDs Over Time.Notes: This figure plots the probabilities that physicians
work in high-cost EDs following their first quarter of work, where their earliest start date occurs on or after Q1-2005.
The blue solid line plots the probability that physicians who are not high-cost work in a high-cost ED, while the red
dotted line plots the probability that high-cost physicians work in high-cost EDs. High-cost physicians are in the top
10% of the Bayesian-shrinkage physician fixed effects distribution for Log(Costs) estimated from Eq (1). High-cost
EDs are in the top 25% of the distribution for the average total costs of ED visits, where the average total costs are
calculated using the entire sample of patients from Table 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159882.g004
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where Ŷht includes either the adjusted average costs for the initial visit, the adjusted 14-day or
28-day revisit rates for the same injury, or the adjusted average costs for the initial visit plus the
costs for revisits for the same injury that occur within 14 or 28 days, depending on the specifi-
cation. Pht are the average characteristics of the physicians on staff in hospital h in year-quar-
ter-weekday-hour t. δh is a hospital fixed effect and Tt includes year×quarter, weekday, and
shift fixed effects.
Eq (5) asks, if the share of ED physicians with less than two years of experience increases
from 0 to 1, does the emergency department revisit rate increase? Similarly, if an “episode of
care” includes an initial visit plus any revisit within 14 or 28 days for the same injury, do the
total costs for episodes of care increase when the share of physicians with less than two years of
experience increases? If the answers are yes, then physicians who spend more are not necessar-
ily providing better quality care.
Results for Eq (5) appear in Table 9. The first column recreates the first column from
Table 8, but at the aggregated level presented in Eq (5). As the share of physicians with less
than two years of experience increases from 0 to 1, average spending increases by 10.6%
($71.62/$674) and the result is statistically significant at 5% level. Columns 2 and 4 show that
as the share of physicians with less than two years of experience increases, revisit rates do not
change in a statistically significant way, which means that higher spending does not reduce ED
Table 9. Physician Experience and Total Costs for Full Episodes of Care.
Initial Visit 14-Day Episode of Care 28-Day Episode of Care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted Total Costs Adjusted Revisit Rate Adjusted Total Costs Adjusted Revisit Rate Adjusted Total Costs
<2 Years of Experience $71.62* 0.0002 $70.97* -0.0002 $69.48*
(29.38) (0.001) (29.96) (0.001) (30.03)
2–4 Years of Experience $56.88 0.00002 $59.34* -0.00002 $59.77*
(29.60) (0.0009) (30.03) (0.0009) (30.25)
4–6 Years of Experience $39.89* 0.0007 $43.07* 0.0004 $42.17*
(18.49) (0.0007) (18.89) (0.0007) (18.98)
Dependent Variable Mean $674 0.035 $712 0.043 $721
Hospital FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Year×Quarter FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Shift, Weekday FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Patient Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y
Physician Characteristics Y Y Y Y Y
N 886,271 886,271 886,271 886,271 886,271
R2 0.11 0.02 0.21 0.02 0.21
Notes: The dependent variables include the adjusted total costs for initial ED visits, the adjusted probabilities of revisits for the same diagnosis within 14 or
28 days, and the adjusted total costs for initial visits plus any costs associated with 14-day or 28-day revisits. Each column presents estimates from a
separate regression. The sample includes ED visits for all patients with minor injuries in Florida from 2005 to 2011. The unit of analysis is the hospital-year-
quarter-weekday-hour. All regressions control for hospital fixed effects, year×quarter fixed effects, weekday fixed effects, shift fixed effects, and average
physician characteristics. Outcome variables are adjusted using patient age, gender, race, ethnicity, and health insurance. Standard errors are clustered at
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revisit rates. Consistent with these findings, costs for full episodes of care (initial visit + revisits)
in columns 3 and 5 are 10% higher when the share of physicians with less than two years of
experience increases from 0 to 1. The results suggest that physicians who spend the most on
full episodes of care are the least efficient at treating minor injuries. Nevertheless, the lower
bounds of the 95% confidence intervals on the experience estimates are $12.25 and $10.62 for
14- and 28-day episodes of care, respectively, so I cannot reject relatively small differences
across physicians with less versus more experience. Moreover, the previous section made clear
that these spending differences are not a result of innate differences in practice style across phy-
sicians with more or less experience, but rather reflect the fact that less experienced physicians
have not yet sorted into work environments that match their practice styles.
Conclusion
This paper asks whether physicians in the same emergency departments treat similar patients
differently. I focus on patients with minor injuries who should not receive different medical
care and I find considerable variation in physician practice styles within EDs. I also find that
physicians with less than six years of experience spend more per ED visit with no differences in
health outcomes. The association between physician experience and practice styles, however, is
driven by differential sorting between high- and low-cost physicians across EDs over time.
High-cost physicians are more likely to exit EDs over time, but if they remain working in EDs
over time, then they are more likely to work in higher-cost EDs.
This research has raised additional questions about physician mobility and human capital
that are out of the scope of this paper. One question is why high-cost physicians exit EDs over
time, and where do they go? Another question relates to the process by which physicians sort.
Many hospitals contract with physician groups to staff their EDs. Sorting between ED physi-
cians and hospitals may be the result of new contracts between hospitals and physician groups.
Alternatively, physician groups may assign physicians to different EDs over time based on phy-
sician preferences. Answers to these questions may shed light on why some hospitals remain
persistently higher-cost than others.
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